Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Mark Robinson and Lori Robinson v. Mount
Logan Clinic : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William J. Hansen; Karra J. Porter; Christensen & Jensen; Attorneys for Appellants.
Elliot J. Williams; Dennis C. Ferguson; Robert C. Keller; Williams & Hunt; Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic, No. 20061168 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/7046

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

71

I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

MARK ROBINSON and LORI
ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. 20061168
MOUNT LOGAN CLINIC, L.L.C,
Defendant/Appellee.

Appeal from the Judgment of the First Judicial District Court, State of Utah
Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge
District Court No. 060100223

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
William J. Hansen
Karra J. Porter
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 W. South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: 801-323-5000

Elliott J. Williams (A3483)
Dennis C. Ferguson (A1061)
Robert C. Keller (A4861)
WILLIAMS & H U N T
P. O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: 801-521-5678

Attorneys for Appellants
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

FILED
.ITAH APPELLATE COURT?

APR 1 9 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

MARK ROBINSON and LORI
ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
Case No. 20061168
MOUNT LOGAN CLINIC, L.L.C,
Defendant/Appellee.

Appeal from the Judgment of the First Judicial District Court, State of Utah
Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge
District Court No. 060100223
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
William J. Hansen
Karra J. Porter
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 W. South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: 801-323-5000

Elliott J. Williams (A3483)
Dennis C. Ferguson (A1061)
Robert C. Keller (A4861)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: 801-521-5678

Attorneys for Appellants
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

References to Parties

2

B.

Statement of Facts

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

5

THE DISTINCTION PLAINTIFFS DRAW BETWEEN A
FAILURE TO ACT AND AN ALLEGEDLY NEGLIGENT
AFFIRMATIVE ACT IS NOT IMPORTANT UNDER PLAIN
TERMS OF SECTION 78-14a-102, AND BY ITS UNAMBIGUOUS
LANGUAGE THE STATUTE BARS PLAINTIFFS' NEGLIGENCE
CLAIMS AGAINST MOUNT LOGAN
5

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp., 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 890,
100 Cal.App.4th 1190 (Cal.App. 2002)
Arnold Indus, v. Love, 2002 UT 133, 63 P.3d 721
Boone v. Rivera, 80 Cal.App^ 1322 (2000)
Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81,1f 34,130 P.3d 325
Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (Utah 1998)

10
1
8-10
6
7, 8

Statutes and Rules
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-101

8,11

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102

1, 4, 5, 7, 9-11

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)

1

ii

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the district court correctly ruled that the applicable language of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l), which states that cc[a] therapist has no duty to warn or
take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior of his client or
patient/5 barred Plaintiffs5 negligence claims against the Mount Logan Clinic even if
those negligence claims are characterized as arising from a negligent affirmative act
rather than a failure to act.
The district court5s decision is reviewed for correctness in light of the
undisputed facts as found by the district court, which facts are not challenged on
appeal. Arnold Indus, v. Love, 2002 UT 133, 63 P.3d 721.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to
provide protection from any violent behavior of his client or
patient, except when that client or patient communicated to the
therapist an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly
identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall be
discharged if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to
communicate the threat to the victim, and notifies a law
enforcement officer or agency of the threat.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l) (1996).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

References to Parties.

Plaintiffs/Appellants are Mark Robinson ("Robinson"), a Logan police officer,
and his wife, Lori Robinson (collectively "Plaintiffs35 herein). (R. 4 - 5.)
Defendant/Appellant Mount Logan Clinic, L.L.C. ("Mount Logan") is a clinic
employing therapists, including therapist Harris ("Ms. Harris"), who called the
Logan Police department to transport a potentially suicidal patient from the clinic to
a secure facility. (R. 5.)
B.

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiffs do not challenge the following facts material to the district court's
decision, and they are undisputed:
L

On October 4, 2002, Mount Logan's therapist, Ms. Harris, called

Logan City dispatch in connection with a suicidal patient requesting police officers
to escort the patient to a behavioral health unit at Logan Regional Hospital. (R. 5,
93.)
2.

During the call, police dispatch asked, "He doesn't have any weapons or

anything like that?" And Ms. Harris responded, "No." (R. 16, 93.) Plaintiffs do
not allege Ms. Harris actually knew the patient had a weapon, but alleges she knew

2

enough that she should have ccascertain[ed] whether [the patient] was carrying a
concealed weapon/5 (R. 6-7.)
3.

Logan City dispatch sent Robinson and Officer Nazer, another Logan

City Policeman, to Mount Logan to escort the suicidal patient. (R. 5, 93.)
4.

After Robinson and his partner arrived at Mount Logan, but before the

physical confrontation with the patient began, Ms. Harris warned the officers that
the patient might have a gun. (R. 6, 93-94.)
5.

Robinson and his partner attempted to physically escort the patient out

of the clinic, and a struggle ensued. During the struggle, a gun concealed in the
patient's waistband was either intentionally or unintentionally discharged, and the
round struck Robinson in the foot. (R. 6-7, 94.)
6.

Plaintiffs subsequendy filed a Complaint asserting Mount Logan was

negligent because it "breached its duty of care to Officer Robinson55 in "failing to
ascertain whether [the patient] was carrying a concealed weapon; failing to disclose
to Logan City Police Department information which would have put the police on
notice that [the patient] may have been carrying a gun; and affirmatively
representing to the police that [the patient] did not have a gun.55 (R. 7, 94.)

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs3 argument is premised upon a distinction between failing to act to
protect another person and actually undertaking to act on another's behalf, which
distinction may determine whether a duty of care arises at all under traditional tort
law principles. Plaintiffs labor to explicate the distinction, and then baldly assert that
§ 78-14a-102(l) does not apply to a duty arising from the negligent performance of
an affirmative act. Thus Plaintiffs argue that because Ms. Harris undertook to
respond to the dispatcher's question about whether the patient had a gun, instead of
failing to act at all, Ms. Harris could be found liable for negligence regardless of the
limitations imposed by § 78-14a-102.
Plaintiffs3 argument fails because the genesis of the alleged tort duty, whether
allegedly arising from a failure to act or from the act of responding to a question in
an allegedly negligent manner, is unimportant under the unambiguous terms of the
controlling statute. The statute precludes, without limitation, any duty to take
action which constitutes "precautions to provide protection from any violent
behavior" of a patient. Because an alleged duty to ensure the completeness and
accuracy of information provided to the police constitutes taking just such
precautions to provide protection, the statue bars Plaintiffs5 Complaint here. The
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district court correcdy dismissed Plaintiffs3 Complaint against Mount Logan as a
matter of law.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTINCTION PLAINTIFFS DRAW BETWEEN A FAILURE
TO ACT AND AN ALLEGEDLY NEGLIGENT AFFIRMATIVE ACT
IS NOT IMPORTANT UNDER PLAIN TERMS OF SECTION
78-14a-102, AND BY ITS UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE THE
STATUTE BARS PLAINTIFFS5 NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS AGAINST
MOUNT LOGAN.
In their brief, Plaintiffs describe at length the common-law distinction
between a failure to act and an affirmative act allegedly performed in a negligent
manner. Aplts.5 Br., 7-12.

CC

[A] party who assumes a duty not otherwise owed must

do so in a non-negligent manner." I d at 12. ccWhat plaintiffs [] claim is that,
regardless of whether [Mount Logan] initially had any duty to act, when [Mount
Logan] did act, it had duty to do so in a non-negligent manner.35 IcL at 7.
According to Plaintiffs, therefor, § 78-14a-102 does not apply because ccit addresses
only the failure-to-act prong of negligence law, . . . it says nothing to exempt
therapists from liability for negligently performing an affirmative act.53 Id. at 13.
Plaintiffs5 bald assertion, that the statute does not apply to the particular duty
they allege arose in this case, is not supported by the unambiguous terms of
§ 78-14a-102(l). The broad language, ccno duty to . . . take precautions to provide

protection from any violent behavior from a client," makes no distinction between a
duty allegedly arising from a failure to warn or take other action and a duty arising
from the affirmative act of undertaking to respond to a question and doing so in an
allegedly negligent manner. The language precluding a duty ccto take precautions to
provide protection from any violent behavior" is plainly inclusive of alleged duties to
accurately perform even some assumed obligation of protection.
Stated another way, the alleged duty ccto ascertain whether [the patient] was
carrying a concealed weapon" in order ccnot to affirmatively misrepresent a hazard,"
which Plaintiffs assert Mount Logan owes, is simply a form or characterization of a
duty to "take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior," which
the statute obviates. Plaintiffs ask the Court to hold otherwise based upon their own
ipse dixit, but provide no analysis whatsoever of the unambiguous statutory
language.
Rather than relying on a party's characterizations of its claims, this Court will
look to the substance of what is alleged. See, e.g., Tensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81,
H 34,130 P.3d 325 (noting that ccwe pay little heed to the labels placed on a
particular claim, favoring instead an evaluation based upon the essence and substance
of the claim."). The "essence and substance" of Plaintiffs5 claim here is that
Ms. Harris should have taken precautions to protect Plaintiffs which she did not
6

take, ccascertain[ing] whether [the patient] was carrying a concealed weapon/ 3 and
responding accurately to the dispatcher's question. A duty to take such precautions
is precluded by § 78-14a-102, regardless of whether Plaintiffs claim the duty arises
from an affirmative act rather than a failure to act.
Moreover, in Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (Utah 1998),
this Court expressly rejected such characterizations of claims to avoid the statutory
bar. Plaintiffs in Wilson attempted to characterize the duty as something other than
a duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection:

cc

[t]he [plaintiffs] filed

their complaint in this case, alleging that Valley Mental Health breached its duty by
not properly treating [the patient].33 Wilson, 969 P.2d at 417 (emphasis added).
See also id. at 418:
[T]he [plaintiffs] contend that even though the Code so limits
the listed persons5 liability, under our case law, or a logical
extension thereof, Valley Mental Health had a duty to properly
treat or control [the patient]. They argue that because Valley
Mental Health failed to treat [the patient] it failed to discover the
threat to Jayleen and the children. Therefore, a duty to Jayleen
and her children exists under the common law because Valley
Mental Health should have known of the threat [the patient]
posed based on the grounds that breached its duty by not
properly treating [the patient].
However, the Court rejected the plaintiffs3 characterizations of the duty, holding
that:
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section 78-14a-101 exclusively defines the duty of a therapist in
cases where it is alleged that a therapist had a duty to warn or
take precautions to provide protection from the violent behavior
of a client. There is no such duty unless there is an actual threat
of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably
identifiable victim communicated by the patient to the therapist.
Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
In their brief, Plaintiffs rely heavily on Boone v. Rivera, 80 Cal.App.4th 1322
(2000) (Aplts.' Br. pp. 7-10), which is both factually and legally distinguishable. In
Boone, the defendant who called for police assistance "knew there was an M16 rifle
and a gun safe in the house, and that [the perpetrator] had threatened to kill the first
police officer that arrived at the residence.'3 80 Cal.App.4th at 1326 (emphasis
added). Nevertheless, in calling for police assistance the defendant had informed
police that the perpetrator was "not violent" and that "she did not know the type or
number of guns in the house." I d The plaintiff Boone was the first officer
responding to the scene, and the perpetrator shot the officer precisely as he had
threatened to do. I d
Not surprisingly, the Boone court focused heavily on the extent the harm that
befell the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant to distinguish other cases
utilizing a common-law, special relationship analysis:
In Tilley, the Court concluded an attack on the officer was
not a foreseeable result of the doctor's conduct. Here, both the
8

victim (Boone) and the harm (an immediate assault by an armed
[perpetrator]) were foreseeable given [defendant's] affirmative
misrepresentation that [the perpetrator] was not violent despite
his known threats to kill an officer and other violent propensities.
Based on the facts alleged, we conclude [the defendant] owed a
duty of care to Boon not to misrepresent the nature of the hazard
that he had encountered.
I d at 1333. More significantly, the California court did not parse the language of a
statute remotely akin to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102, but interpreted a California
statute it interpreted as ccreimposing a ca duty of ordinary care which would
otherwise be abrogated by the fireman's rule.553 I d at 1330 (citing Cal. Civil Code
§ 17149.9).
In this case, by contrast, Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege that Mount
Logan's patient made any threat to harm Robinson or any other police officer. He
had threatened to harm only himself, and the therapist made the police aware of that
threat. Although Plaintiffs characterize Ms. Harris5 statement that the patient did
not have a gun as an ccaffirmative misrepresentation,55 they cannot allege she actually
knew that the patient had concealed a gun on his person. The harm that occurred in
this case was not the result of the patient acting on any specific threat to harm a
particular plaintiff, but resulted undisputedly during a struggle when the police were
attempting to disarm him and may not have been an intentional act at all.

9

In light of these distinctions, the comments of the California court in a more
factually analogous case rejecting Boone and finding no duty of care are more
applicable, and also illustrate that applying § 78-14a-102(l) to bar claims in this case
advances public policy. In Alvarez v. Tacmar Pacific Pizza Corp., 122 Cal.Rptr.2d
890, 907,100 Cal.App.4th 1190,1213 (Cal.App. 2002), the Court reviewed facts
involving a defendant's alleged failure to inform police that a perpetrator of murder
had threatened to return to the scene of a fight. The Court rejected the plaintiffs3
citation of Boone, and noted in pertinent part as follows:
The analysis advanced by the dissent is not persuasive
given its public policy implications. In a nutshell, the dissent
would fasten liability upon a restaurant for a murder carried out
by a third party because one restaurant employee did not provide
information to the police which may have been pertinent to their
deciding how to handle the situation. Guerrero (or any
employee) cannot be faulted for failing to realize the significance
the police would place on particular statements (i.e., the
postulate we ccwould be coming back55) or for not knowing what
information the police need to determine the appropriate course
of action. . . .
When the police arrived at the scene, it was their
responsibility to conduct an investigation adequate to address the
situation. The record certainly discloses there were numerous
individuals, including the Alvarez group, who had pertinent
information had the police contacted them. It was not the
responsibility of the restaurant or its employees to ensure all
relevant information was conveyed to the police. Indeed, they
cannot be presumed to know what constitutes all relevant
information. To impose that responsibility would require a
10

commercial enterprise to understand the subdeties or nuances of
police procedure, an obligation supported neither by policy nor
common sense.
Law enforcement is trained to investigate and prevent
crime. This includes a proper investigation at the scene of an
altercation such as that found in this case. To shift that burden to
a pizza parlor is simply not good policy. In sum, to the extent
the restaurant had any duty, it performed that duty when it called
911. To conclude otherwise impermissibly shifts the burden of
effective law enforcement from the police to those who witness a
problem and call for police intervention. Citizens would dial 911
at their peril.
122 Cal.Rptr.2d at 907,100 Cal.App.4th at 1213.
Similarly, it would be poor policy to strain the language of § 78-14a-102(l)
to impose a duty on the therapist calling for police assistance here. While there were
allegedly indications the patient might have a gun, the patient had not threatened
anyone specifically, besides himself, and requiring the therapist to institute a search
or to question the patient to ensure the accuracy of information provided to dispatch
might have had undesirable consequences. Rather, public policy is served when
therapists needing assistance in potentially dangerous situations are encouraged to
summon aid from police who are trained to deal with such situations, regardless of
how the call for assistance might be characterized after the fact.
In short, Plaintiffs3 argument that § 78-14a-101 does not apply here because
"when [Mount Logan] did act, it had a duty to do so in a non-negligent manner35
11

fails to address the applicable statutory language and relies upon cases that are
inapposite. The applicable language of the Utah statute precludes any duty to take
action which constitutes "precautions to provide protection from any violent
behavior55 of a client. Because the actions Plaintiffs allege Mount Logan should have
taken to prevent their injuries constitute just such precautions to provide protection,
whether by failing to act or by acting in a different manner, the district court
correcdy held that the statue bars Plaintiffs5 Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mount Logan respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the district court's judgment and order dismissing Plaintiffs5 Complaint
against Mount Logan.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Jr.day

of April, 2007.
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Robert C. Keller
Attorneys for Appellees
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